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Xenomelia, the “foreign limb syndrome,” is characterized by the non-acceptance of one
or more of one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation
or paralysis. Formerly labeled “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID), the condition was
originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist
and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness
has shifted the focus toward dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present
article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting their shortcomings.
We propose that full insight into what should be conceived a “xenomelia spectrum dis-
order” will require interpretation of individual symptomatology in a social context. A
proper social neuroscience of xenomelia respects the functional neuroanatomy of corpo-
real awareness, but also acknowledges the brain’s plasticity in response to an individual’s
history, which is lived against a cultural background. This integrated view of xenomelia will
promote the subfield of consciousness research concerned with the unity of body and
self.
Keywords: amputation, body integrity identity disorder, body modification, disability, psychiatry, neurology,
sociology, medical ethics
In times when an author can barely write about cognition without
emphasizing its“embodied”aspects, it seems especially compelling
to consider body-brain interactions in the field of consciousness
studies or the cognitive neuroscience of “the self.” In fact, philoso-
phers and scientists agree that knowledge about how the brain
processes bodily sensations and plans executive action is key to
the understanding of the experience of being a conscious self
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). However, an individual’s bodily
self-consciousness is not fully predefined by genes and neural cir-
cuits. It is constantly compared with others’ relationships to their
bodies and evaluated against cultural norms about bodily appear-
ance. In this article we will review work on xenomelia, one variant
of the normal relationships between body and self, that is the
desire of a healthy individual to have a fully functional limb ampu-
tated. We propose a social neuroscience of xenomelia that unifies
neurological, psychological, and sociological approaches to bodily
self-consciousness.
XENOMELIA: A DISORDER OF BODILY SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
While the term “xenomelia” is new (McGeoch et al., 2011), the
condition is not. Several authors cite the eighteenth century case
of a man who enforced the amputation of a leg from a sur-
geon at gunpoint (Johnston and Elliott, 2002; Hilti and Brugger,
2010). Later on, the psychiatric literature has described the desire
for amputation as a paraphilia (Money et al., 1977; Everaerd,
1983) and around the turn of the century as an identity disorder
focusing on one’s body configuration (“amputee identity dis-
order,” Furth and Smith, 2000; Smith, 2004). Most influential
was the large-scale survey by First (2005), in which the term
“body integrity identity disorder” (BIID) was coined. Fifty-two
individuals were administered a structured telephone interview,
which helped characterize the altered bodily self-consciousness
that culminates in desire for amputation (Table 1). The findings
established that (1) the condition is rooted in early childhood,
(2) it is associated with marked distress, often leading to self-
inflicted amputation attempts, (3) there is a male predominance,
and recent studies show that women are more likely to desire
bilateral amputations, and (4) it is, as a rule, accompanied by a
socially non-conform attitude toward and admiration of “handi-
capped” individuals’, especially amputees’, bodies. These observa-
tions let First (2005, p. 919) define the disorder as “an unusual
dysfunction in the development of one’s fundamental sense of
anatomical (body) identity.” While the term BIID is most widely
used in the current-day literature (First and Fisher, 2012), we pre-
fer to use the label “xenomelia,” as it is purely descriptive and
devoid of any interpretation. In particular, it neither suggests nor
excludes the possibility that the desire for healthy limb ampu-
tation is in fact an identity disorder as defined in the DSM-IV.
“Xenomelia” [from the Greek terms Xe (xeno)= foreign and
µελoσ (melos)= limb] points to an estrangement of one or more
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of one’s limbs. It is important to emphasize the broad range in the
wording sufferers use to capture this sense of estrangement. What
follows are some typical firsthand descriptions extracted from the
literature.
“I can feel exactly the line where my leg should end
and my stump should begin. Sometimes this line hurts
or feels numb.” (an individual with amputation desire;
Blom et al., 2012, p. 2)
“I feel myself complete without my left leg . . . I’m over-
complete with it ” (individual with amputation desire; First,
2005, p. 922)
“The soul feels as though it belongs to a body with only one
leg. The body does not correspond to this inner reality.” (man
with amputation desire; Kasten, 2009, p. 17)
“I feel the stump ends in my thighs and a strong ‘desire’
(I don’t have the right word for it) to live with two thigh
stumps.” (man with amputation desire; Kasten and Spithaler,
2009, p. 24)
“I was eager for people to watch me, to see that my legs
couldn’t move. [ . . .] I was full of emotion. I felt whole for the first
time in my life.” (48-year-old woman with desire for paraple-
gia describing her feelings while pretending to be paralyzed
and wheel-chair bound; Bruno, 1997; p. 247)
“With BIID, the numbness goes beyond the legs. It seeps
into my emotions. . . [ . . .] I wandered in [to Transabled.org]
through a link and I never left . . . it’s making the numbness feel
not so shameful.” (man with xenomelia; Davis, 2012; p. 611)
The first few citations in the above list are mainly taken from
authors propagating (or at least considering) a neurological, i.e.,
brain-based account of xenomelia. The focus here is altered sen-
sation, or “paresthesias” (Blanke et al., 2009) localized to the
undesired body part. More frequent are statements where the
estrangement is less physical, but involves a vague (mind-based)
feeling of non-belonging of the undesired limb(s) or the gen-
eral notion of a disturbing “overcompleteness” of one’s body.
Finally, xenomelic estrangement can transcend consciousness of
one’s own body and manifest itself only in the social context, with
the empathic perception or admiration of other peoples’ bodies.
It is only by empathically comparing oneself to conspecifics, who
are amputated, paralyzed, or otherwise “transabled” that one can
anticipate possessing amputated limb(s) with stumps, prostheses,
and mobility aids. As the last two quotes highlight, wholeness can
be achieved by acting on one’s desire in public, or relief from
numbness can be brought about by entering a virtual community
of persons with supposedly similar suffering.
VARIANTS AND ACCOMPANYING FEATURES OF
XENOMELIA
One frequent variant of the desire for amputation is the desire
for paraplegia, i.e., the paralysis of both legs (Giummarra et al.,
2012). From a neurological stance the peripheral absence of one
or both legs and their paralysis due to spinal cord injury appear
worlds apart. A person with the desire for paraplegia usually abhors
the thought of amputation, while one with an amputation desire
(even if bilateral) is typically convinced that being paralyzed from
the waist down would not make him feel “in the right body.”
However, with respect to some frequent correlates of xenomelia,
the two variants are surprisingly similar (Blom et al., 2012 for a
tabular comparison). The main phenomenological correlates of
the different forms of xenomelia concern the erotic attraction
to amputees or paraplegics and the urge to simulate the desired
state.
Paraphilic pre-occupation with the desired body modifica-
tion is reported by 46–87% of samples in published accounts of
xenomelia (First, 2005; Blom et al., 2012; Giummarra et al., 2012)
and preferably targets amputation or paralysis of the legs. While
sexual arousal is rarely the primary explanation of the desire to
change one’s own anatomy, it is worthy of attention with respect
to the ontogeny and phenomenology of the condition. When
considering functional neuroanatomy, the association of one’s
consciousness for legs (compared to that for arms) and sexual
feelings and behavior has its origins in the proximity of corti-
cal regions representing legs and the sexual organs (Kell et al.,
2005). It is well-documented that leg, but not arm (although,
see Giummarra et al., 2011b) amputees experience referred gen-
ital sensations to their phantom limbs (Aglioti et al., 1994). In
paraplegia, phantom leg sensations may also spread to the gen-
ital area, leading to full-blown orgasmic experiences (Avenarius
and Gerstenbrand, 1967). Many paraphilias can be traced to dis-
crete events or experiences during childhood, when children are
enthusiastic imitators through the process of developing their self-
consciousness, often engaging in socially inappropriate mimicry
and role-play (Whiten et al., 2009). In xenomelia, as with other
paraphilias, such discrete experiences may become the fetishistic
targets during puberty, likely by conditioning (Koksal et al., 2004),
into the individual’s sexual interests and masturbatory fantasies
(Abel et al., 2008). Rather than forming a springboard to psy-
chodynamic elaborations, the lower limb predominance together
with the erotic components of xenomelia may illustrate that
“body schema” involves more than proprioceptive, somatosen-
sory, and motor aspects of an individual’s development, but is
also tightly linked to a person’s sexual identity (Schilder, 1935;
Money, 1984; De Preester, 2011). It may even transcend individual
consciousness and embrace cultural dimensions. Thus xenomelia
and fetishistic foot-binding practices in traditional Chinese cul-
ture probably rest on similar neural mechanisms (McGeoch,
2007).
The second sign frequently accompanying xenomelia is the
simulation of the desired state. Persons with xenomelia typi-
cally spend a great deal of time obsessing about their desired
or “beloved” body-state (Sorene et al., 2006; Kasten, 2009). The
majority report “pretending” behaviors, whether these simply
involve mental imagery, or motor action in accordance with their
desired body form (e.g., binding the legs, sitting on them, using
tourniquets to reduce lower limb perception, transferring to/from
a wheel chair without using the legs, or trying not to engage
the undesired limbs with motor tasks; Riordan and Appleby,
1994; First, 2005; Giummarra et al., 2012). Individuals at the
more “extreme” end of the spectrum of xenomelia meet at least
some of the criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder. While
Oddo et al. (2009) found some support for OCD in people with
xenomelia, the obsessions tend to be limited to their altered bodily
self-consciousness.
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Given that both paraphilic and pretending components are
equally characteristic to the amputation and paraplegia vari-
ant of xenomelia we propose that both variants “belong to the
spectrum of BIID” (Giummarra et al., 2012, p. 35). The desire
to become incontinent, castrated (Roberts et al., 2008), deaf
(Veale, 2006), blind (Johnson et al., 2011), or suffering from
neurological dysfunction (Kolla and Zucker, 2009) may be part
of this spectrum.
XENOMELIA: MIND-BASED VS. BRAIN-BASED
INTERPRETATIONS
As a rare and peculiar state of self-consciousness, xenomelia has
been approached from both psychiatric and neurological fields.
We designate the former approaches as “mind-based,” even if their
conclusions might be formulated in neuro-terms. Mind-based
approaches are indispensable to the understanding of any neu-
ropsychiatric conditions as, even if we adhere to a brain-mind
identity view of consciousness, mind and brain are two differ-
ent things (Figure 1). The language appropriate for speaking
about minds is not appropriate for speaking about brains (Horne,
1994). Just as there is no “suffering brain,” there is no “atrophic
mind.” The many case reports on xenomelia and the system-
atic group studies that historically followed them (Table 1) are
essentially mind-based. They provide important clues to devel-
opment and phenomenology of the condition, to (purportedly)
eliciting events and individual strategies of coping. As can be seen
from the specific findings highlighted by the original authors, the
six major questionnaire studies have painted a multicolored pic-
ture of xenomelia. The convergence across studies paves the way
for prospective neurologically oriented investigations, particularly
focusing on the neural correlates of the primacy of legs over arms,
left-sided symptom preponderance (Table 1) and the often pre-
cise demarcation line between accepted and non-accepted body
territories.
Brain-based accounts of xenomelia were originally motivated
by comparing xenomelic individuals’ bodily self-consciousness
with that reported by neurological patients after brain damage.
Syndromes like (hemi)asomatognosia (felt absence of body parts;
Dieguez et al., 2007), somatoparaphrenia (lack of limb owner-
ship; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009), or misoplegia (hatred toward a
body part; Loetscher et al., 2006) are most often mentioned.
They are indicative of right parietal cortex dysfunction. Direct
evidence for impaired parietal lobe functions in four subjects
with xenomelia comes from McGeoch et al.’s (2011) magnetoen-
cephalographic study, which showed an unresponsive superior
parietal lobule to tactile stimulation of specifically “undesired”
parts of the body. Hilti et al. (2013) described structural abnormal-
ities in this structure and the right anterior insula of 13 men with
xenomelia, supporting parallels between xenomelia and disturbed
self-consciousness in disorders like somatoparaphrenia (Karnath
and Baier, 2010). Despite the fact that the insula has advanced, in
recent years, to an island representing pretty much every think-
able function (Craig, 2011 for overview), we consider the insular
anomalies to be meaningful: not only is the right insular cortex
known to be key for integrating interoceptive bodily feelings, but
it is a core region for the convergence of somesthesis and sexual
arousal (Hilti et al., 2013). We predict that we will see an increased
awareness for the neurological underpinnings of xenomelia in the
near future. Nevertheless, the clear shortcomings of a purely brain-
based approach should not be overlooked (Sedda, 2011); among
many other clinical observations, the switching of a longstanding
desire from a left-sided to a right-sided leg amputation (Kasten and
Stirn, 2009) or the sudden occurrence of new amputation desires
after previous ones were satisfied (Sorene et al., 2006) are not easily
explainable by the sole reference to neural mechanisms. Further-
more, any observed correlations between mind and matter is often
silently interpreted in a unidirectional way, i.e., from brain to mind.
Brang et al. (2008, p. 1306) considered that the study of xenomelia
“may provide key insights into the question of how neural activity
gives rise to mental phenomena” (p. 1306). From this view point,
they interpret their finding of differential skin response to pain in
affected vs. non-affected body parts in two xenomelia patients as
evidence for a congenital brain dysfunction. Interpretations like
this imply that states of the mind must ultimately be caused by
states of the brain. This view is not in line with the focus of the
present Research Topic nor is it necessarily supported by the cur-
rent literature on neuroplasticity. While interest in brain plasticity
was originally triggered from observing behavioral consequences
of cortical reorganization after deafferentation, the focus has now
shifted toward “experience-dependent neuroplasticity.” Such plas-
ticity extends far beyond the juvenile period (Lillard and Erisir,
2011), and comprises sensorimotor training (Bezzola et al., 2012)
and musical experience (Parbery-Clark et al., 2012) in the aging.
Together with evidence for epigenetic alterations in both mind and
neural matter (Ventura-Junca and Herrera, 2012), and yet other
socio-cultural factors (see below), such communication between
nature and nurture should not be hastily interpreted as a primacy
of either brain or mind. Thus, the correlation between structural
cortex alterations and the strength of an individual’s amputation
desire (Hilti et al., 2013) could indicate that xenomelia is the con-
sequence of early, perhaps even prenatal neural development (Hilti
and Brugger, 2010). However, equally plausible is the assumption
that years, if not decades, of a hostile attitude directed to a part of
the body, and potential behavior-induced peripheral atrophy (e.g.,
see Bensler and Paauw, 2003; Storm and Weiss, 2003), may have
produced cortical changes.
XENOMELIA SPECTRUM DISORDERS: INTEGRATING BRAIN,
MIND, AND SOCIETY
Brain-based and mind-based approaches, even in their unification,
will not solve the riddle of xenomelia. Bodily self-consciousness
is continuously shaped by culture-bound norms regarding body
appearance and the tolerated extent to which this appearance may
be modified (Jordan, 2004). A full understanding of non-psychotic
individuals’ feeling of “being in the wrong body” and their desire
to correct the mismatch between body and self by massive mod-
ifications of the prototypical, four-limbed corporeal morphology
can only be reached by respecting the crosstalk between brain,
mind, and society (Figure 1; notably also applying to related alter-
ations of bodily self-consciousness; see Giummarra et al., 2011a,
for review).
The social dimension of body-image, as unpopular as it may
be in current-day neuroscience, has been fully appreciated in
former times. When writing on “the sociology of the body-image,”
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FIGURE 1 | A view of xenomelia research that integrates three
approaches. While the crosstalk between neurological
(“brain-based”) and psychological (“mind-based”) approaches is
commonplace, anthropological, and social studies of bodily
appearance and its modifications have been neglected in
neuroscience accounts. A social neuroscience view of xenomelia
respects the interactions between an individual’s perception of
the own body in relation to others’ bodies and as influenced by
normative standards. It will also explore the neural correlates of
these interactions and investigate, for instance, the constraints of
empathy by social norms, or the impact of a person’s
preconceptions of a “handicapped body” on brain function and
structure.
Schilder (1935, part III) highlighted that “There exists a deep com-
munity between one’s own body-image and the body-image of
others. In the construction of the body-image there is a continual
testing to discover what could be incorporated in the body [. . .]
the body-image is a social phenomenon” (p. 217). The continual
comparison between the self and others is at the heart of empathic
reactions during encounters with those who live in different
bodies. Almost half of xenomelic persons consider such encoun-
ters highly meaningful life events, for some they are even causative
triggers of their later desires (Aoyama et al., 2012). It is possible that
one prerequisite of xenomelia is an overemphatic response and
an exaggerated expression of mimicry, i.e., the imitative incorpora-
tion of another person’s postural and gestural displays (Chartrand
and Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2009). This incorporation may
lead to identification with a body-image that does not correspond
with one’s own anatomy and functionality. Although the empathic
merging of one’s own with others’ bodies is greatly facilitated by
vision and the cutaneous senses (Morrison et al., 2010) it does
not necessarily rely on real-life encounters with other people. Lan-
guage is a powerful mediator of the construction of intersubjective
representations (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962), and recent research
has focused on the particular role of internet communication.
“Prosumption” is the blurring of production and consumption in
the communicative (originally economic; Toffler, 1980) context.
While we all prosume as communicating members of a soci-
ety, cyberspace-mediated prosumption is especially prominent in
shaping the identity of marginalized or stigmatized individuals.
Davis (2012) analyzed the information exchange among mem-
bers of an internet site devoted to persons with xenomelia. She
found that transableism has become a fluid identity construct that
is shaped by, and at the same time shapes, the identity of fel-
low bloggers’. Social media has likewise been identified as having
a powerful impact on the creation of “transient mental illnesses”
(Hacking, 1999; Baubet et al., 2007) or“contagious desires”(Elliott,
2000). While it is debatable whether xenomelia is an illness of
the mind, brain, or a culture-bound syndrome, its inclusion in
DSM-V would undoubtedly present a Janusian face to the “trans-
abled” community. On the one hand it might pave the way for
legally sanctioned surgery in response to intolerable distress (Ryan,
2009), on the other hand it would contribute to further mar-
ginalize a form of bodily self-consciousness that may be viewed
as a “non-normative form of embodiment” (Sullivan, in press)
rather than an illness (a similar issue is central to disorders of gen-
der identity and sexual development; Reis, 2007; Lawrence, 2009,
2010).
A future social neuroscience of bodily self-consciousness will
acknowledge that, as mighty as social processes like prosumption
might be, they do not invalidate neurological findings that
differentiate people with xenomelia from people without.
Empathic resonance can change basic perceptual processes (Lopez
et al., 2013) and corresponding neural changes are to be expected.
The integration of social, psychological, and neurological views
of xenomelia will offer a unique way to explore the reciprocal
influences between brain, mind, and society in relation to corpo-
real awareness and the experience of the self.
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